Prescriptivism As An Ethical Theory- A Study in the Philosophy of R.M. Hare

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The most constructive employment of the tools of linguistic analysis has undoubtedly been in the emergence of various met ethical theories in recent times. Emphasis shifts from attempts to formulate normative codes for the guidance of our lives to the recognition of language of morals and the logic of moral discourse as distinctive philosophical problems. Similar attempts have been made with regard to aesthetic and religious languages as well, all as the aftermath of logical empiricism. Minute attention has been paid to the diversity of the uses of language, rather than treating all language according to a preconceived pattern of explanation. Hare (and Von Wright along with him) occupies a very significant position among thinkers who deal with the 'logical geography' of moral language, which latter is no longer dismissed as being meaningless ('ethics is transcendental') or having a purely emotive or persuasive force. Moral language is recognized to be an authentic and autonomous use of language, having a distinctive logic of its own. Dr. Sabhajeet Singh has done well in taking Hare for intensive study, treating prescriptivism as the point of departure for a detailed and meticulous delineation of the complexities of ethical language and logic. He has read extensively and has delved deep in the literature, giving an in-depth analysis of the core ethical concepts, with great accuracy and perceptiveness. His book will, I am sure, be highly appreciated by scholars of moral philosophy.

Richard Mervyn Hare subscribes to the view that ethics is the logical study of the language of morals. For, our moral problems being unlike crossword puzzles in the sense that the former cannot be evaded for long and the confusion about them does not merely constitute theoretical darkness but leads to some unnecessary practical perplexities, are becoming day by day more complex and tormenting. We thus need an understanding of the complex of the logic of moral language by which they can be easily and correctly solved. He holds that the function of moral philosophy is to help think better about moral questions by exposing the logical structure of the language in which these thoughts are set forth.

This view is most appealing in so far as ethics which has a history of nearly 2000 years lacked still a systematic, conclusive and infallible framework of its own; it did not have a logic and language by which we could test, build, restructure and thus develop our moral thought. The reason is that most philosophers undertook as their business only to form moral standards or opinions by criticizing their predecessors and neglected this most important task of moral philosophy. The question arises whether, just as there are separate languages of mathematics, natural sciences and social sciences by means of which we operate with a logical system to formulate and verify their conclusions, we could not have a language and logic of ethics for corresponding purposes in moral Philosophy. There are, however, other questions also related to this: could really a logical study of the language of morals be characterized as an adequate study of ethics, does this theory correspond with our ordinary moral experience is Hare consistent logically and empirically? These are the issues with which I am largely concerned in this study.