In consistency with the stand taken by the author in his previous work, viz. "Problem And Philosophy: A Metaphilosophical Approach", the present work - which may also be treated as a sequel to the former, is an attempt to understand the moral problem in relation to its attempted solution where it is affirmed as the problem of moral evaluation the solution being sought in the moral act that tries to 'create' the consciousness of the moral value of absolute goodness. The myth of a sure method for the attainment of moral goodness has been exploded. Ends generally assumed to be conducive to such attainment have been recommended to be pursued on only an experimental basis, but never dogmatically. Actions merely 'right' in virtue of their compliance with existing social norms have been distinguished from truly moral acts of extranormal goodness. Pleasures have been classified into targetable and non- targetable ones, and pleasures of each type have been given 'due' importance in connection with the pursuit of goodness. By prescribing supposedly sure methods of moral attainment, i.e. attainment of ideal goodness, the traditional standards of morality like Hedonism, Rigorism, etc. (have been shown to) have committed the 'Prescriptive Fallacy'. Freedom to act morally becomes possible in virtue of the creative nature of the moral act. Moral freedom is the basis of every other freedom that may be intellectual, aesthetic, social, political, economic and religious.

Like my previous work about the nature of the philosophical problem determining the overall position of philosophy (viz. "Problem And Philosophy: A Metaphilosophical Approach"), the present work is also a thought-process adopting the style of an enquiry characterized by philosophical problem-consciousness, arriving at results that are mainly tentative - yielding only a few well-defined products. Naturally, the present work which may be treated as a sequel to its predecessor, is also not suitable for a grand introduction to a ready-made subject matter, though it may be prefaced with some remarks which I may dare assume to be relevant.

Undoubtedly the work has its polemics - not only against the so-called moral standards known by such names as Hedonism, Rigorism etc., but also against popular dependency on one or another particular method of attaining 'goodness', and against the almost normal practice of confusing mere social propriety with goodness proper. But the work is also an attempt to be positive about what constitutes goodness proper, what constitutes the nature of the moral act, what is meant by freedom of the will, what role this freedom plays in the moral life of the individual as well as of the community, and how sexual freedom can assume moral importance. The democratic angle of freedom has only been touched very lightly. But no discussion of freedom can be complete without an exploration of its relation to democracy, which, however, I intend to take up in a future work where I would like to use the doctrine of 'gentle coercion' which I have used in connection with sexual freedom, as the guiding principle of a vibrant democracy with its success dependent on a happy combination of personal liberty and social control - the combination being effected by the determination of the correct balance between the two, subject, however, to change from time to time due to change of social circumstances requiring appropriate change in the manner of exercising social control. The importance of unconditional faith in the moral value of goodness has been emphasized in the proposal for a new standard of morality, which I have termed Moral Fideism in the absence of a more suitable expression.

**Contents and Sample Pages**