India’s External Intelligence: Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)

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About the Book

The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is India’s premier intelligence agency. Like the CIA in the USA and MI-6 in the UK, it is responsible for external intelligence. However, unlike intelligence agencies in many democratic countries that are subjected to public and parliamentary scrutiny, the activities of RAW remain shrouded in mystery. Though RAW has been written about earlier, most of the authors are of foreign origin, the largest number being from Pakistan. The few Indians who have written about RAW are outsiders, whose knowledge has been gleaned from those who have served in the agency. There is not a single inside account of RAW.

The present book is the first account by a person who has served in RAW at a senior level and was able to see its functioning from close quarters. Since he was concerned with signal intelligence rather than human intelligence operations, most of the coverage is devoted to the former. The book brings to light several lacunae in the functioning of the country’s top intelligence agency, the most glaring being the anomalies in procurement of equipment, lack of accountability and our dependence on foreign sources, with the resultant threat to national security. Some of the hitherto untold stories recounted in the book are: 1. How equipment was purchased from foreign companies at prices that were more than ten times the market price by altering technical parameters. 2. How the security of the Prime Minister was almost compromised for a few pieces of silver. 3. The circumstances leading to the death of one of RAW’s brightest officers, Vipin Handa. 4. The stories of moles in the country’s top intelligence agencies, including that of Ra binder Singh. 5. The bitter rivalry between RAW and IB, and its effects. 6. The modus operandi offoreign intelligence agencies in recruiting moles in India.

The Indian taxpayer has a right to know how his money is spent, and after reading this book, he will not only be wiser but also angry. The author hopes that the anger gives rise to a public debate and an increase in accountability of our top intelligence agencies.

About the Author

After pre-commission training at the NDA, Kharakvasla and IMA, Dehradun, Major General VK Singh was commissioned into the Corps of Signals on 27’h June 1965. He is an alumnus of the Staff College, Wellington; the College of Defence Management, Secunderabad and the National Defence College, Delhi. He has also been an instructor at the Military College of Telecommunication Engineering; the Army War College and the Staff College. He raised the signal regiment of the Indian Army’s first mechanised division, in 1982.

During his career spanning 37 years in the Army, he served in several important appointments, the last being Chief Signal Officer of the Western Army. In November 2000 he joined the Cabinet Secretariat (Research and Analysis Wing), where he served up to June 2004, when he retired from government service. The present book is based on his experiences during his stint with RAW.

His varied interests include adventure sports, military history and journalism. He participated in the Himalayan Car Rally thrice, from 1982 to 1984. He is a regular contributor to magazines and journals, and many of his stories and poems were published in the Illustrated Weekly, Filmfare, Femina and Eve’s Weekly in the seventies and eighties. In later years he took to professional writing and has authored three books: Through Saga of the Corps of Signals (200 I), Leadership in the Indian Army -Biographies of Twelve Soldiers (2005), History of the Corps of Signals, Volume II (2006).

Preface

The thought of writing a book had not entered my mind until about a year after joining RAW. As time passed, I began to notice several shortcomings and anomalies, which I felt were having a negative impact on the effectiveness of the organisation. Rather than an elite force, which people expected it to be, it had turned into a typical government department, with its attendant ills. Unconsciously, I made comparisons with the Army, where I had spent my entire adult life, and found glaring disparities. The armed forces are also, in a sense, government departments, but are free from most of the ills that plague our bureaucracy. The three services, and each of their components, however small, have a distinct ethos of their own. This esprit de corps, as we call it, was totally missing in RAW, which, I thought, was a pity. Unlike other government departments, RAW is not bound by red tape. There are no unions, and officers have extensive powers of punishment as well as reward. There is no shortage of funds, and the organisation has the means not only to increase its efficiency but also improve the quality of life of its members. What, then, was lacking? After a lot of reflection, I thought of two reasons - lack of leadership and accountability.

Leadership is the key to excellence, in any field, be it the armed forces, education, industry, sports - in fact, almost every human enterprise. If one compares performances of similar entities whose results range from excellent through mediocre to bad, the reasons, in most cases, lie in the performances of leaders, not the members of the groups. During the three and a half years that I spent in RAW, I found several examples of bad leadership, some of which have been included in the book. Of course, it is not to say that all officers of RAW lack leadership. I came across several officers who would do credit to any organisation, and these stood out in the crowd. In fact, were it not for these officers, RAW would not have enjoyed the reputation and standing it still has in the intelligence community. Unfortunately, they were in a minority.

Having worked for almost ten years on a book about military leaders, I could not help draw inferences regarding the presence or absence of this quality from everyday events that happened around me. This was the first time I had to work with people who often did not mean what they said. In the Army, one dealt with colleagues - and that includes superiors and subordinates - with all cards on the table. No one had a hidden agenda, or an axe to grind. If a soldier appeared to be extra dutiful or deferential, all that he probably wanted was a few days leave. And when a colleague turned on the charm, he had nothing more sinister in mind than borrowing your golf clubs. Mistakes were acknowledged and rebukes accepted, with no hard feelings on either side. But here in RAW, things were different. The mutual trust and concern for each other that we had taken for granted while in uniform were missing. As a result, one always felt a little uneasy when interacting with others, which is obviously not the best way to get things done.

More than leadership and trust, the most glaring shortcoming seemed to be lack of accountability. Since RAW was not answerable to any outside agency - the control of the PMO was perfunctory, at best - many officers thought that they were not only above the law but a law unto themselves. This sort of belief is often found in police and intelligence agencies in totalitarian regimes, but appear out of place in ademocracy, such as ours. This superciliousness and arrogance often translated into activities that could not be termed as lawful or honourable. Unlike in other developed societies such as the USA, where the legislature acts a watchdog on every organ of the executive, including intelligence and security agencies; in India these organisations were beyond the pale of parliamentary review. Their actions, however improper, would never be brought to the notice of the public. This appeared to me an unacceptable state of affairs, totally against the democratic principles that are enshrined in our Constitution.

I tried to find out what other people had written about RAW. Apart from a book by Ashok Raina, which was published in 1981, very few Indian authors have attempted to write on the subject. Of course, articles have appeared from time to time, but since most of these have been written by people who have never served in RAW, they are often speculative and inaccurate. An exception is B. Raman, an ex- Additional Secretary of RAW, who writes regularly in journals and newspapers. Strangely enough, several books have been written on RAW in Pakistan, including some by scholars who have undertaken research projects funded by the government or professional institutions. But most of the writing is biased and imprecise, which is not surprising, given the history of bad blood between the two nations since Independence.

Writing about an intelligence agency in India is no easy task. For one, there is very little information in the public domain. Ironically, we know more about the CIA than about RAW, because everything about the former is on their official website. The Right to Information Act has been passed, but the intelligence agencies are beyond its purview. The Official Secrets Act, 1923, was a draconian law passed during British rule, to be used against Indians who were found to be acting against British imperialist interests. Though totally out of date, the law has not been repealed, in spite of vociferous demands from many quarters. With the enactment of the Right to Information Act, the Official Secrets Act has become an anachronism that deserves to be consigned to oblivion. One of the most violated provisions of the Act relates to contact with foreigners. According to the Act, Government officials cannot meet, converse or have any contact with foreign nationals without obtaining permission from their departments. I wonder how many officers who are regularly seen with foreign diplomats at Page 3 parties follow these rules.

There is little doubt that the concept of security has changed during the eighty years since the Official Secrets Act was promulgated, especially after Independence. With the resources available today, very little can be hidden. Until very recently, it was forbidden to take photographs even of railway bridges. With satellite imagery, even much smaller objects can be pinpointed in far greater detail than any photograph taken by a conventional camera. Similarly, the strength and dispositions of military units was considered a highly classified subject. Today, the complete ORBAT (Order of Battle) is known to everyone, including the opposite side. Information concerning aircraft, ships, tanks and similar armaments that was heavily guarded is now available on the Internet. Publications such as lane’s regularly give out details of the military inventory of every country. The only thing classified today is the mind of the commander i.e. the way he is going to fight the battle.

Though I had more or less decided to write this book before I left RAW, what strengthened my resolve was the publication of Maloy Dhar’s book on the IB, called Open Secrets. Around this time, I also came across Brigadier Tirmazi’s book about the ISI, called Protiles of Intelligence. Both Dhar and Tirmazi have given details of operations conducted by these agencies, in which they were involved. In this book, I have not included any operation of RAW for the simple reason that I was never involved in any. My job involved communications and signals intelligence, and I have primarily dealt with these subjects. Even here, only a few case studies have been included, to bring out some aberrations. What then is the reason for writing this book? I feel that the Indian taxpayer has a right to know how public money is spent. He may not be interested in details, but he would certainly want an assurance that it is not being squandered, or put to illegitimate use. There is a need to bring all organs of the state under the supervision of Parliament, without exception. If the defence forces can be subject to statutory audit and parliamentary review, I do not see any reason why intelligence agencies should be exempted. Members of Parliament are public servants, and keeping information from them is an affront to their integrity and loyalty to the country.

Contents