Discordant Notes- The Voice of Dissent in the Court of Last Resort (Part-1)

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About the Book A dissenting judgment, as ordinarily understood, is a judgment or an opinion of a judge, sitting as a part of a larger bench, who 'dissents' (i.e., disagrees) with the opinion or judgment of the majority. Dissents, said a great American judge, represent the 'brooding spirit of the law', which may translate itself into a majority view in the future.

Tracing, exploring and analyzing all the dissenting judgments in the history of the Supreme Court of India, from the beginning till date, Rohinton Nariman brings to light the cases which created a deep impact in India's legal history. From Keshava Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay in 1951 to State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd in 1953 to the famous Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar in 1955 to Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. Girdharilal Pashottamdas and Co. in 1966, Superintendent & Legal Remembrancer, State of West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta in 1967, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India in 1993, Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India in 1997 to Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology in 2002, United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen and Ram Singh v. The State of Delhi in the same year and the great dissent of Justice Khanna in the ADM Jabalpur case among others, this two-volume definitive work is a thorough examination of the important dissenting judgments of the Supreme Court of India, and of some of the Judges of the Supreme Court who have gone down as 'Great Dissenters', for having written dissents of great legal and constitutional importance, many of which have gone on to be later accepted as stating the correct position of the law.

Comprehensive, definitive and authoritative, this is a must have for legal scholars and practitioners. Besides, the book will greatly interest policy makers as well as everyone interested in India's legal history.

About the Author ROHINTON F. NARIMAN is a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, being only the fifth direct appointment in the history of the Supreme Court, having authored over 350 judgments. He is an ordained Parsi priest, having written two books on Zoroastrianism, and its influence on the other major religions of the world. He is also an expert in western music and a scholar of comparative religion and comparative constitutional law. A polymath, he is an institution in himself. Justice Nariman practiced as a Senior Counsel, Supreme Court of India for over three decades, appearing in some of the most important cases in India's constitutional and legal history. Chief Justice Venkatachalaiah amended the Supreme Court rules in order to make him a Senior Counsel at the young age of 37 against the mandatory minimum age of 45. Justice Nariman did his post-graduation in Constitutional Law from Harvard Law School, and practiced Maritime Law in New York at Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens for a year. Recently, the Harvard Law School selected four of its most illustrious alumni worldwide to deliver a talk to the Harvard Alumni Association. It is a matter of pride that Justice Nariman was selected as one of the four in company with a former President of the International Court of Justice at The Hague and a former President of the Republic of Ireland. For his outstanding judgment in the well-known Privacy case (K.S. Puttaswamy), he was declared a 'Hero'-one of five global heroes of Human Rights and Communications Surveillance-by Access Now, an international digital rights advocacy group.

Preface A dissenting judgment, as ordinarily understood. is a judgment or an opinion of a judge, sitting as part of a larger bench, who 'dissents (i.e. disagrees) with the opinion or judgment of the majority. Dissenting judgments or opinions appear in different ways. A dissent is nonetheless a dissent, despite the fact that it may arrive at the same conclusion as that of the majority, but by an antithetical, or even different. set of reasons. Sometimes, the dissenting judgment may be total, in the sense that it distances itself not only from the reasoning of the majority judgment but also from its conclusion. Sometimes, the dissent may be partial, in that the dissenting judge agrees with certain points in the majority judgment, but disagrees with some other point or points, and ultimately reaches either the same or a different conclusion. For example, while a majority decision of the Supreme Court of India may call for a high court judgment to be upheld. the dissenting judge may, after dissenting on one or more points, send the matter back to the high court on remand to decide a particular issue/issues afresh. Sometimes, there can even be a wolf hiding in sheep's clothing-a concurring judgment that may be styled as such, but may in fact reach the same conclusion by reasoning which does not square with that of the majority. This book has all the aforesaid examples of judgments which may be categorized as 'dissenting' judgments, in the sense just mentioned.

In this book. I done a thorough study of all the dissenting judgments of the Supreme Court of India, and have attempted-in my own way to classify most of them according to their quality, conservatism and, the opposite-foresight.

**Contents and Sample Pages**